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PRODUCTS LIABILITY-Assumption of Risk Is an Affirmative Defense To a Products Liability Suit Based upon
Strict Liability in Tort. Mere Contributory Negligence
Will Not Bar Plaintiff's Relief.
While in the course of his employment on May 19, 1961, James
Williams, Jr., was operating a "Bus Brown" 468R Trencher. This
trenching machine, with which Williams had had two and one-half
hours of operating experience, was a gasoline driven device designed
and manufactured by the defendant, Brown Manufacturing Company.
It was one of several delivered to Williams' employer earlier in that
month.
While the machine was purportedly designed to be operated from the
side, it was equipped with a set of handlebars and operating levers
which could be manipulated from the rear. In addition, there were
operating instructions printed on the trencher which were more easily
read from a position behind the machine. Williams was operating the
trencher from behind these handlebars when the teeth on a boom which
actually dug the trench struck a 3/4-inch gas service pipe buried in the
ground. The resulting force pulled the machine downward, compressing its tires. When the teeth suddenly slipped free from the pipe, the
machine jumped or "bucked", knocking Williams to the ground. The
device repeated this action, again striking and injuring Williams, before a fellow worker was able to shut it off.
The machine was operated by an arrangement of Vee belts which
served to convert the power from the engine into the movement of the
trenching teeth around the boom. As a safety precaution, these Vee
belts were designed to slip when subjected to this great a force; however, on this occasion they failed to do so.
An instruction booklet shipped with each trencher stated under the
section entitled "Adjustments and Maintenance" that the Vee belts were
adjustable, and that they should be tightened if they became loose
enough to slip during normal operation. This notice was followed by
a caution against adjusting the belts too tightly, since it would prevent
them from slipping under shock load. Under "Service and Maintenance Tips" the manual stated that an overly tight adjustment of the
belts might cause "short belt life" and "shearing [of] Woodruff Keys."
However, the only statement relating to adjustment of the drive belt
in the "Suggestions for Safety" section of the instruction manual
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was that the machine had to be stopped before any such adjustment
was made. Williams subsequently admitted having read portions of
the instruction manual on the evening preceding his injury.
In May of 1963, more than two years after the trencher was sold,
but within two years of the date of injury, Williams brought a negligence action against both Brown Manufacturing Company and Illinois
Power Company, his employer. A fourth amended complaint adding
an allegation of strict liability against Brown Manufacturing Company
was later filed, following the adoption of the theory of strict liability
in tort in products liability cases by the Illinois Supreme Court in
1965.1 The primary basis for this allegation was that the belt slippage
safety arrangement was defectively designed.
At the close of
his case, however, Williams was permitted to allege as an additional
dangerous condition that the machine had no warning against operation
from behind and between the handlebars. The plaintiff at no time
alleged his exercise of due care for his own safety as would be required in an ordinary negligence case in Illinois.' On defendants' motions, the trial court struck the allegation of negligence against Brown,
and gave a directed verdict for Illinois Power Company. With respect
to Brown Manufacturing Company, the only remaining defendant, the
trial court struck its affirmative defenses of the statute of limitations
and assumption of risk. In its opinion, the proof was insufficient to
support either defense. A jury verdict was reached for the plaintiff
in the amount of $40,000.00 based on the theory of strict liability in
tort.
Before the hearing of its appeal in the Appellate Court of Illinois,
Fifth District, the defendant moved for disqualification of the entire
panel of judges of the appellate court on the grounds that it was prejudiced or interested. The defendant theorized that the entire panel of
judges was tainted by the close political association with the single
judge who previously disqualified himself because he had participated
in the initial proceedings as a member of the plaintiffs law firm. After
the appellate court denied the motion and affirmed the verdict for the
plaintiff, the defendant appealed on eight grounds to the Supreme
Court of Illinois. That court ruled on three of them, accepting the
appellate court's treatment of the other questions as raised.
HELD:

1.

REVERSED AND REMANDED

The close political association of the members of the appellate

1. Suvada v. White Motor Company, 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
2. Swenson v. City of Rockford, 9 Il. 2d 122, 127, 136 N.E.2d 777 (1956);
Austin v. Public Service Co. of Northern Illinois, 299 II. 112, 120, 132 N.E. 458 (1921).
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court did not require disqualification of the entire panel of judges
merely because one of its members had participated in the initial proceedings at trial as a member of plaintiff's law firm and was himself
disqualified.
2. In a suit for personal injury resulting from a defective product
under the theory of strict liability in tort, the statute of limitations begins to run from the date on which the plaintiff first knows of his right
to sue, which necessarily occurs on the date of the injury, rather than
from the date upon which the product left the control of the defendant.
3. In a products liability case based upon strict liability in tort,
a plaintiff need not plead and prove his exercise of due care for his
own safety, and mere contributory negligence as it is known in Illinois,
will not bar recovery. Assumption of risk, however, is an affirmative
defense, and will constitute such a bar.4 Since there was evidence
which when viewed in a light most favorable to the defendant, could
permit a jury verdict for the defendant on this issue to stand, the defense of assumption of risk should not have been stricken, and a new
trial was ordered.
The decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in Williams v. Brown
Manufacturing Company is primarily significant for its consideration of the concept of contributory negligence as applied to a products
liability case based on strict liability in tort, and its apparent resolution
of the conflict in Illinois law5 as to what plaintiff conduct will bar his
3. Defendant's motion was not for a change of venue, but for a change of judges,
on the grounds that this panel could not give him an impartial trial. As evidence of
this, defendant pointed out that the court's opinion in a relevant case, Wright v.
Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 fll. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966), written by the dis-

qualified judge, had been used by the plaintiff's attorneys at the trial of this case
before it had been officially published in reporters.

Generally a motion of this nature requires proof of a more direct or extensive relationship or interest than that stated here before it will be granted. See 48 C.J.S.

Judges §§ 72-97 (1947); 19 Ill. Dig. Judges 455-460 (1955); 23 Call. Ill. Dig., Judges
166 (1957).
4. The defense of assumption of risk was held to be available to the defendant
despite the lack of any master-servant or contractual relationship between he and the

plaintiff. The master-servant relationship is required for a valid defense in negligence
cases. Conrad v. Springfield Consol. R. Co., 240 Ill. 12, 88 N.E. 180 (1909); Sweeney
v. Matthews, 94 Ill. App. 2d 6 (1968), an appellate court decision, had previously

taken the same position as the supreme court in this case.
5. This conflict (in Illinois law) is exemplified by the following cases decided
after Suvada v. White, 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965):
Adams v. Ford Motor Co., 103 Ill. App. 2d 365 (1968). A plea of lack of
contributory negligence was surplusage and need not be proven; Sweeney v.
Matthews, 94 Ill. App. 2d 6 (1968), assumption of risk is the only bar to recovery and is an affirmative defense; Dunham v. Vaughn & Bushnell Mfg. Co.,
86 Ill. App. 2d 315 (1968), exercise of due care for own safety means assumption of risk; Vlahovich v. Betts Machine Co., 101 Ill. App. 2d 123

(1968), contributory negligence cannot be an issue where no negligence by
the defendant is involved.
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recovery in such a case. It should also resolve any doubt as to which
party must bear the burden of pleading and proving such conduct or
freedom from it. Unlike the rule applied in ordinary negligence cases
in Illinois, 6 a plaintiff in a strict tort liability case need not bear the
burden of pleading and proving his freedom from contributory negligence.
The conflict in the law resulted largely because of the statement made
by the Illinois Supreme Court in General Motors v. Bua 7 that in strict
tort liability cases as well as negligence cases "It is necessary to prove
that the plaintiff was in the exercise of due care for his own safety." 8
This statement appears to indicate that contributory negligence is properly at issue in a strict liability case; however, prior to the decision in
Bua, the Illinois courts had not gone beyond assumption of risk to
allow contributory negligence measured by the objective standard to
bar recovery. The court in Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Company specifically rejected the implication in Bua that pure contributory
negligence is at issue in a products liability case.
Of secondary importance is the court's holding that the statute of
limitations will not begin to run until the injury resulting from the defectively manufactured product occurs. The court viewed this result
as necessary in order to avoid emasculating much of the consumer protection afforded by application of the theory of strict liability in tort to
products liability cases.
While not previously settled, this application of the statute of limitations to strict tort liability cases was predictable for at least two reasons.
First, in Gray v. American Radiator and Standard Sanitary Corp.,9 relied upon by the Williams court, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded
that for purposes of the "long arm" statute, 10 a tortious act is committed
in the state in which the injury occurs. The court supported this conclusion by stating in dictum that: "In applying statutes of limitations
our court has computed the period from the time when the injury is
12
Secondly, because Illinois has, since Suvada v. White,
done.""
6. Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill. 2d 193, 239 N.E.2d 445 (1968).
7. 37 Ill. 2d 180, 226 N.E.2d 6 (1967).
8. Id. at 196.
9. 22 111.
2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961).
10. ILL. REV. STATS. Ch. 110 § 17(1) (1969): "Any person, whether or not a
citizen or resident of this State, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts
hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such person, and if an individual, his personal
representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of action
arising from the doing of any such acts: . . . (b) The commission of a tortious act
within this State ....
11. Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d at 435, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961).
12. See note 1, supra.
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treated suits of this nature as falling within the category of strict liability
in tort (not contract or warranty), no cause of action arises until the
injury occurs. Therefore, the statute of limitations cannot begin to run
until this time. Illinois thus avoids the problem which arises in those
states which characterize strict liability as a breach of implied warranty. Such jurisdictions have difficulty reconciling the policy of consumer protection through strict liability with the fact that the contract
or warranty was breached as of the date of sale.' 3
The defendant had argued that the breach of warranty rationale
should be used in order to avoid compelling it to prove elements of a
defense to a stale claim which arose over two years from the time the
trencher left its control. In support of this contention, an elaborate
case was hypothesized in which Ford Motor Company could be sued
today for defects in the design of a Model-T automobile. This, stated
the defendant, would be the extreme state of affairs which would result
4
if the statute were deemed to begin running at the date of injury.'
The court answered this contention convincingly by recognizing the
presence of inherent safeguards against such injustice. One element
of plaintiff's case is proof of the existence of the defective condition at
the time the product left the seller's control. This determination of
whether the product was defectively designed must be made on the
basis of the standards and knowledge prevailing at the time the product
left the defendant's control and not when the injury occurred. This
requirement, in addition to the difficulty of sustaining the burden of
proof in a case such as that hypothesized by the defendant, provides
adequate safeguards for manufacturers against injustices arising from
the passage of time.
While Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Company decided the manner of the application of the statute of limitations in strict liability in
tort actions, its most important aspect is its analysis of the issue of the
applicability of contributory negligence in such cases. The Illinois Supreme Court, in its opinion on rehearing, rejected simple contributory
negligence as a bar to plaintiff's recovery. In its earlier opinion in this
case, the court had held that a plaintiff's failure to exercise due care
for his own safety, at least to the extent that he unreasonably failed to
discover a defective condition or guard against its existence, would bar
his recovery. The burden of pleading and proving freedom from such
conduct was, as in negligence cases, placed upon the plaintiff. Illinois,
had this earlier position not been revised, would have stood as the only
13.
14.

Wright, Defective Products and Strict Liability, A.B.A. LAW NOTES, April, 1969.
Defendant's Appellate Brief pp. 58-60.

Case Comments

1970

jurisdiction among those which have examined the relationship of contributory negligence to strict liability in tort, 5 to place such a burden
on plaintiffs or to allow this type of conduct to bar recovery.
The entire field of strict liability in tort is a hybrid of the law developed in the two fields of negligence and breach of warranty. It
has developed from MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.'6 which did away
with any privity requirement in a suit for negligent manufacture, and
Greenman v. Yuba Power Co.," 7 which first did away with the requirement of negligence, and, finally, to Suvada v. White,"' which adopted
strict liability for defective products in Illinois. Since it is a hybrid,
concepts of law from both breach of warranty cases and negligence
cases have been applied to different aspects of strict liability in tort.1 9
The authorities which have refused to recognize contributory negligence as a bar to plaintiff's recovery have relied upon breach of warranty cases, and elected to apply the law developed in that type of action
to this aspect of strict liability. 20 The Illinois court agreed with this
position, rather than, as in its first opinion, viewing the relationship
between contributory negligence and strict tort liability as best defined
by traditional concepts of negligence law.
The issue of contributory negligence arose in this case when evidence
was introduced that the "bucking" may have been caused by improper
adjustment of the drive belts. The defendant had argued that, since
plaintiff had failed to plead and prove his exercise of due care for his
own safety, his complaint, as in a negligence case, failed to state a cause
of action. Because the plaintiff had partially read the instruction manual which explained this hazard and still failed to discover the defect,
the court, in its first opinion, stated that there was conceivably some
evidence of contributory negligence. Thus, it was first held that the
15. One questionable case holds that failure to use due care is a bar to plaintiff's
recovery. Maiorino v. Weco Products Co., 45 N.J. 570, 214 A.2d 18 (1965); but the
issue involved there was really misuse.
16. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).

17.

59 Cal. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).

18. See note 1, supra. For a historic discussion of the development of the field,
see W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, Ch. 4 (3d Ed. 1964); Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel,
69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser, Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966).
19. E.g., Prosser, Fall of the Citadel, supra note 18, at 824. "There appears no
reason to doubt that strict liability has made no changes in the rule, well settled in
the negligence cases that the seller of a product is not to be held liable where the
consumer makes abnormal use of it." (emphasis supplied).
Prosser also states that strict liability carries over the negligence theory that intervening dealers' failure to discover a defect does not relieve manufacturers. Id. at 827,

then says:

"There has been as yet no case involving strict liability in tort which dis-

cards warranty, but it appears quite certain that the same rules will apply."
840 (emohasis supplied).

20. Prosser, supra note 18.
note 17.

Id. at

Traynor, J. in Greenman v. Yuba Power Co., supra
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trial court's assumption that a plaintiff need not plead and prove his
exercise of due care for his own safety was erroneous, because the effect
of this assumption was to remove from the plaintiff the burden of pleading and proving that his injuries were proximately caused by the defective condition, rather than his own failure to exercise due care. On
rehearing, however, the court viewed this evidence as possibly constituting the generally recognized defense of assumption of risk. The
court also viewed evidence that the plaintiff may have understood that
the trencher was to be operated from the side rather than from behind
as giving possible grounds for this same defense. Since the trial court
had stricken the defendant's affirmative defense of assumption of risk,
the supreme court reversed, stating, "It would not be unreasonable for
a jury to conclude that plaintiffs decision to operate the machine from
this admittedly inconvenient position might have been prompted more
by the sloping terrain than by any characteristic of the trencher itself."'"
The court then applied the standard Illinois test 2 for striking such
defenses as defendant's, and decided that, viewing the totality of the
evidence in its aspect most favorable to defendant, "[W]e cannot say
that the evidence as a whole so overwhelmingly favors plaintiff that a
jury finding for defendant on this issue could never stand."2
The court's first opinion in this case, which had held contributory negligence to be a bar to plaintiff's relief, was intricately drafted, but
raised as many questions as it answered. In that opinion, the supreme
court had begun its analysis by examining the types of conduct by the
plaintiff which might bar a recovery in strict liability in tort cases, and
had classified this conduct into three categories: (1) contributory negligence based on the objective standard,2 4 (2) assumption of risk,2 5 and
(3) use of the product in a manner which could not reasonably have
been foreseen by the manufacturer, commonly called "misuse". The
court had stated that the first category is broad enough to include the
latter two, and is contributory negligence as defined in this state; 26
then it had explained that the fact that assumption of risk is judged by
a subjective standard and the other two by the objective standard is of
little significance because there are few instances in which a plaintiff
21. Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Company, - Ill. 2d -, - (1970).
22. Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494, 232 N.E.2d 700 (1967).
23. Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Company, - Ill. 2d -, (1970).
24. "Failure to exercise due care for one's own safety, which would include failure
to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence,
as determined by application of the objective reasonable-man standard .......
Unpublished opinion, William v. Brown Manufacturing Company.
2.
"Use of the product after discovery of the defect." See also note 30, infra.
26. "The first category is contributory negligence as defined in this State and is
broad enough to encompass all three categories."
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has recovered in the face of proof indicating a reasonable man would
not have acted as the plaintiff did.
While it is generally agreed that use of the product in an unreasonable manner, for a purpose neither intended nor foreseeable by the defendant ("misuse"), will bar recovery, it is not clear who has the burden of pleading and proof on this issue. The Illinois Supreme Court
in Suvada v. White 7 cited Greenman v. Yuba Power Co.,28 which required as an element of the plaintiff's proof a showing that the product
was used in a normal fashion. However, in Suvada, itself, the court
made no such requirement and the issue never arose. The Williams
court, however, stated: "[P]Ilaintiff's misuse of the product may bar
recovery. This issue may arise in connection with plaintiffs proof of
an unreasonably dangerous condition of proximate causation or both."
(emphasis added).
Assumption of risk has also been generally recognized as a bar to
the plaintiff's recovery. With reference to this category of plaintiff
conduct, the appellate court in Williams 29 interpreted the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Suvada, which adopted § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, as also having adopted Comment (n) to
that section. That comment recognizes assumption of risk as an affirmative defense in strict liability cases, 0 but also states: "Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence
consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or to
guard against the possibility of its existence."'" Because the appellate
court felt that this was the current state of the law in Illinois, it believed
that the only issue of contributory negligence to be allowed was that of
assumption of risk, and since this was an affirmative defense, the burden of pleading and proving it fell upon the defendant.
In those jurisdictions which have adopted strict liability in tort, it is
also necessary in order for the plaintiff to recover that he show that
the product was unreasonably dangerous when it left the seller's control. This requirement is often felt to be an element of proof of the
product's defectiveness;3 2 however, it is stated as a separate element
27.
28.
29.

See note 1, supra.
See note 17, supra.
93 Il1. App. 2d 334, 236 N.E.2d 125 (1968).

30.

"On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which consists in vol-

untarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger, and commonly

passes under the name of assumption of risk, is a defense under this Section as in other
cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is aware of
the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product and is
injured by it, he is barred from recovery."

31.
32.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

Id.

OF

TORTS

§ 402A, Comment (n) (1965).
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of proof in Suvada v. White. 3 The proof needed to establish this condition requires an application of the reasonable man objective standard,
i.e., "The article sold must be dangerous to the extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases
it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics."3' 4 It is this application of the objective standard in
determining whether or not the product is "unreasonably dangerous"
which first led the Illinois Supreme Court to apply the same standard
to determine what conduct of the plaintiff would bar relief. In its
original opinion "the court had reasoned that a necessary element of
plaintiff's case is a showing that the defective condition renders the
product unreasonably dangerous" which "necessarily implies that a
plaintiff exercising due care for his own safety would not have discov35
ered the defect.
It may appear that this language taken from the first opinion, not
adopted in its final opinion, requires the plaintiff to plead and prove
the same facts twice. This apparent redundency would arise because,
under Suvada, a reasonable man would not be aware of the defect in order to establish its unreasonably dangerous condition, and, in negating
contributory negligence, that a reasonable man in his position would
not have learned of the defect or guarded against its existence. However, there is a clear distinction between these two requirements. Proof
of an unreasonably dangerous condition relates only to the time the
product left the control of the manufacturer. Proof of freedom from
contributory negligence, on the other hand, would require that the
plaintiff prove, based on all facts which come to his knowledge, that
he was not negligent during the entire period beginning with the sale
of the product and ending with his injury. This distinction between the
two requirements should indicate that the latter cannot necessarily be
inferred from the former. On reexamination, however, the court, perhaps realizing this distinction, explained that the implication of a duty
to inspect all products for potential defects, with the consequent effect
on the policy of consumer protection, was not intended. In view of its
goal on rehearing, to "adopt a more appropriate and workable framework for treatment of plaintiffs recovery-barring conduct in strict
product liability cases," the court adopted the Restatement and appel33. "The plaintiffs must prove that their injury or damage resulted from a condition of the product, that the condition was an unreasonably dangerous one and that

the condition existed at the time it left the manufacturer's control."
supra note 1, at 623.
34. See note 31, supra, at Comment (i).

35.

396

Suvada v. White,

Unpublished opinion, Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Company.

1970

Case Comments

late court's position by recognizing only misuse and assumption of risk
as types of conduct which bar recovery. It also affirmed the position
that assumption of risk is an affirmative defense, with the burden of
proof resting on the defendant.
Another problem inhering in the first supreme court decision in
Williams, which has been avoided, was the matters which might be
considered in determining if the plaintiff did in fact act as a reasonable
man during the interim period between purchase and injury. The
court had stated in its first opinion that the sole basis for its reversal of
the Williams case lay in the possibility that the plaintiff failed to use
due care to discover the defect or guard against its existence. However,
it defined the conduct with which it was dealing as:
Failure to exercise due care for one's safety, which would include
failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against
the possibility of its existence, as determined by application of the
objective reasonable-man standard.3 6 (emphasis added).
This statement seems to indicate that contributory negligence may
consist of more than a mere failure to discover the defect or guard
against its existence. This conclusion is further supported by the following statement from the court's first opinion:
The first category is contributory negligence as defined in this state
and is broad enough to encompass all three categories. The question is whether traditional concepts of Illinois contributory negligence law are to be applied here or whether
the strict liability
37
theory necessitates adoption of a new standard.
This quotation can be read as indicating that all traditional concepts
of contributory negligence were to be applicable in a strict liability in
tort case, however, the first sentence may also have answered the question raised by the earlier quotation, that is, the other defenses "included" are misuse and assumption of risk. Finally, on this point, the
court had originally said:
The conflict in the cases, if any exists, revolves about the question
whether plaintiff's failure to discover a defective condition in a
product, or to realize the possibility of its existence and guard
against it, should preclude his recovery. Should in other words,
the conduct described in the first category, i.e. contributory negligence as measured by an objective standard, bar recovery? 38
The first opinion of the court, as evidenced by the above quotations,
left open the question of whether any failure to exercise due care for
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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one's own safety would bar recovery, or whether the concept of contributory negligence as it applied to strict liability was limited to a failure
to find the defect or guard against its existence. While the case was
clear on its own facts, further explication of what plaintiffs in future
products liability cases must plead and prove seemed necessary.
In both opinions, the appellate court's decision was reversed because
the plaintiff had partially read the instruction manual regarding adjustment of the drive belts. In the first opinion, this was viewed as constituting possible evidence of contributory negligence, 39 while in the revised opinion it was looked upon as possible evidence of an assumption
of risk. Either interpretation would potentially bar recovery. Although the court made no express finding of the adequacy of the notice
in the manual, if the plaintiff did, in fact, learn of the possible danger,
this would constitute assumption of risk, and the court would be justified in reversing on this ground. If, however, the manual or its warnings were not sufficient to put him on notice of the danger, the issue becomes failure to warn, and the plaintiff could not have assumed the
risk in failing to find the defect. The court also relies, as possible
grounds for the assertion of the defense of assumption of risk, upon
some evidence that the plaintiff knew that the trencher should not be
operated from behind. This it did despite the fact that one of the alleged defects was a failure to warn him against operation from that position. To allow the defenses of contributory negligence or assumption
of risk under these circumstances:
is to indulge in circular reasoning, since usually the plaintiff cannot
be said to have assumed a risk of which he was ignorant, or to
have contributed to his own injury when he had no way of reasonably ascertaining that the danger of injury existed. On the other
hand, if the plaintiff knew of the danger from an independent
source, the manufacturer's40 failure to warn would not be the proximate cause of the injury.
39.
[Dlefendant's argument that the machine was designed to be operated from
the side, and that the purpose of the handlebars was to facilitate guiding the trencher
when moving in a forward direction from one work area to another, is singularly un-

persuasive in the
the machine or in
partially read the
proper adjustment

absence of any instructions or warnings to this effect either on
the manual. . . . The fact that the evidence indicates plaintiff had
instruction manual which explained this hazard (bucking from imof drive belts) could, conceivably, constitute some evidence of con-

tributory negligence ...

This case was tried on the assumption that plaintiff need not plead and prove his
exercise of due care for his own safety. That assumption was incorrect and the trial
court rulings were erroneous insofar as their effect was to remove from plaintiff the
burden of pleading and proving that the injuries were proximately caused by the defective condition and not by his failure to use due care for his own safety." Unpub-

lished opinion, Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Company.
40.

Dillard & Hart, Product Liability: Directions for Use and Duty to Warn, 41

VA. L. REv. 145, 164 (1955).
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A third factual possibility is that the manual was sufficient as to its
warning, but plaintiff was negligent in failing to read or understand it.
It is this type of conduct which the court originally held should bar
recovery; however, this could hardly be described as "voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known danger," which is generally the definition of assumption of risk. It would seem that the only
means of establishing that defense would be findings that the manual
contained an adequate warning and that the plaintiff had read it. The
court felt that there was some evidence of both.
In its revised opinion, the court implies a distaste for the subjective
test used in determining assumption of risk, and states:
[W]hile the test to be applied in determining whether a user has
assumed the risk of using a product known to be dangerously defective is fundamentally a subjective test, in the sense that it is his
knowledge, understanding and appreciation of the danger which
must be assessed, rather than that of the reasonably prudent person (Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 496D, comment (c)), it
must also be remembered that this is ordinarily a question to be
determined by the jury. That determination is not to be made
solely on the basis of the user's own statements but rather upon
the jury's assessment of all of the facts established by the evidence.
No juror is compelled by the subjective nature of this test to accept
a user's testimony that he was unaware of the danger, if, in the
light of all of the evidence, he could not have been unaware of the
hazard (Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 469D, comments (d)
and (e) ....

41

Since the court found some evidence that the manual was adequate
in its warning, and that the plaintiff had read and understood it, its
decision to reverse on the ground that the defense of assumption of
risk should not have been struck is sound. The court's other basis,
that there was evidence that the plaintiff knew of the danger from operating the machine from behind by obtaining this information from
an outside source or through experience is, however, questionable.
Since the plaintiff had proven at the trial level that the defect was in
failing to warn him of this danger, and that this defect caused his injury, it is impossible for him to have assumed the risk. If he knew of
the danger, the failure to warn could not have caused his injury.
The decision to alter its position as regards the concept of contributory negligence was a sound policy decision by the court. Strict liability in tort is imposed for the protection of the consumer. It is liability without negligence and not liability without fault. There are
41.

Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Company, -

Ill. 2d
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many ways of being negligent even while exercising due care to discover the defect or guard against its existence. The policy reasons for
adopting strict liability as stated in Suvada militate against precluding
recovery for some unrelated negligent act by a plaintiff. The court
states in its revised opinion that it intended no implication of a "duty
to inspect" to be placed on all plaintiffs in like suits. It follows that
they also intended no other duties which might have been implied by a
broad definition of contributory negligence. Of course, if the original
opinion could be interpreted as having adopted all aspects of contributory negligence applicable to a negligence case to a products liability
case, it could have led to a situation where the manufacturer of a defective product would fortuitously benefit from the user's failure to exercise due care for his own safety when all the user may have done is
put the product to the test.42
LEE J. RADEK

42. See Bahlman v. Hudson Motor
where a car, designed to be safer in
feature, was, in fact, not. The driver,
allowed to recover under breach of
warranty "to the test."
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Company, 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W. 309 (1939),
an accident than others due to a certain safety
who negligently involved himself in a crash, was
warranty because the accident merely put the

